How 20th century presidents grew power at home and abroad

By Mikay­la Bun­nell
UConn Jour­nal­ism

Read more to learn about expan­sions of exec­u­tive pow­er under pres­i­dents Franklin D. Roo­sevelt, Lyn­don B. John­son and Ronald Rea­gan.

Franklin D. Roo­sevelt (1933–1945) 

Expan­sions under the New Deal and a pro­posed way to reshape the Supreme Court

Franklin D. Roo­sevelt expand­ed the pres­i­den­cy to more than just chief exec­u­tive, the Miller Cen­ter said — he made the pres­i­dent a chief leg­is­la­tor, a “drafter of pol­i­cy.” Roosevelt’s New Deal leg­is­la­tion moved the coun­try away from dual fed­er­al­ism, in which states and the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment are two dis­tinct enti­ties each with their own pow­ers, to coop­er­a­tive fed­er­al­ism, where state and fed­er­al gov­ern­ment over­lap more in terms of pow­ers.  

In his first inau­gur­al address on March 9, 1933, Roo­sevelt made clear that he was ready to do what it took to bring the nation out of the Great Depres­sion. He said that he was ready to make unprece­dent­ed moves to com­bat the unprece­dent­ed dif­fi­cul­ties the coun­try was fac­ing.

“It is to be hoped that the nor­mal bal­ance of exec­u­tive and leg­isla­tive author­i­ty may be whol­ly ade­quate to meet the unprece­dent­ed task before us,” he said. “But it may be that an unprece­dent­ed demand and need for unde­layed action may call for tem­po­rary depar­ture from that nor­mal bal­ance of pub­lic pro­ce­dure.” 

Pres­i­dent Franklin D. Roo­sevelt. Con­gress del­e­gat­ed many pow­ers to Roo­sevelt to help him get the coun­try out of the Great Depres­sion. Pho­to cour­tesy Loc’s Pub­lic Domain Archive

Roo­sevelt asked that Con­gress give him “broad exec­u­tive pow­er to wage a war against the emer­gency” if they couldn’t pass his rec­om­mend­ed mea­sures of their own to end the Depres­sion. Con­gress end­ed up doing just this, as much of the New Deal con­sist­ed of Con­gress del­e­gat­ing pow­ers to the exec­u­tive branch to reg­u­late the econ­o­my.  

“The New Deal pro­duced a pres­i­den­cy that was more insti­tu­tion­al­ly inde­pen­dent of Con­gress and more polit­i­cal­ly free of the par­ties than ever before,” wrote John Yoo, a law pro­fes­sor at the Uni­ver­si­ty of Cal­i­for­nia Berke­ley. Roo­sevelt led Con­gress to cre­ate a “vast admin­is­tra­tive state.”  

For much of the New Deal leg­is­la­tion passed, the exec­u­tive branch draft­ed the leg­is­la­tion and sent it to Con­gress, which approved it after glanc­ing at it — or not look­ing at all, Yoo said. 

One of these bills was the Nation­al Indus­tri­al Recov­ery Act and the sub­se­quent Nation­al Recov­ery Admin­is­tra­tion, which put in place by exec­u­tive order after the orig­i­nal act was passed. The act sus­pend­ed antitrust laws and required com­pa­nies to “to write indus­try-wide ‘codes of fair com­pe­ti­tion’ that effec­tive­ly fixed prices and wages, estab­lished pro­duc­tion quo­tas, and imposed restric­tions on entry of oth­er com­pa­nies into the alliances,” accord­ing to the Nation­al Archives.  

The Nation­al Recov­ery Admin­is­tra­tion made agree­ments with indus­tries about work hours, pay rates and price-fix­ing, cre­at­ing more than 500 codes of fair prac­tice for many indus­tries. The act and the agency did not last long, how­ev­er. In A.L.A. Schechter Poul­try Corp. v. U.S. (1935), the Supreme Court struck them down, say­ing that the pres­i­dent can­not have unchecked pow­er to do what­ev­er he thinks is nec­es­sary to achieve a goal. 

This opin­ion became a dri­ving force behind Roosevelt’s court-pack­ing plan. Much of the New Deal leg­is­la­tion was found uncon­sti­tu­tion­al, most­ly on the grounds of vio­lat­ing the sep­a­ra­tion of pow­ers between the exec­u­tive and leg­isla­tive branch­es. Accord­ing to the Supreme Court His­tor­i­cal Soci­ety, “no Supreme Court had ever struck down so many laws so quick­ly.”  

In 1936, after win­ning reelec­tion for his sec­ond term in a land­slide, Roo­sevelt pro­posed increas­ing the Supreme Court from nine jus­tices to 15. This plan would have allowed Roo­sevelt to appoint six new jus­tices that would, ide­al­ly, vote in his favor, though Roo­sevelt sug­gest­ed the addi­tion­al jus­tices would only serve to light­en the court’s case­load. The pres­sure cam­paign is cred­it­ed with push­ing the Court to change their harsh out­look on New Deal leg­is­la­tion, though the plan failed to pass in Con­gress. For exam­ple, the Court upheld the Social Secu­ri­ty Act in 1937 and upheld state min­i­mum wage laws after pre­vi­ous­ly rul­ing against them.

Roo­sevelt also expand­ed the president’s social reach through his Fire­side Chats, which “con­nect­ed the White House to ordi­nary Amer­i­can homes as nev­er before,” accord­ing to the White House His­tor­i­cal Soci­ety. At the peak of the New Deal era, Roo­sevelt would hold these chats on the radio twice a year. Dur­ing these chats, Roo­sevelt would cam­paign for and defend his poli­cies direct­ly to Amer­i­cans. Yoo said this helped make the pres­i­dent a “dri­ving force for pos­i­tive gov­ern­ment,” rather than just a polit­i­cal leader.

Lyn­don B. John­son (1963–1969) 

Expan­sion through the Great Soci­ety and the Viet­nam War

Lyn­don B. John­son became pres­i­dent after the assas­si­na­tion of John F. Kennedy in 1963. His pres­i­den­cy saw a “vast expan­sion in the role of the nation­al gov­ern­ment in domes­tic affairs” accord­ing to the Uni­ver­si­ty of Virginia’s Miller Cen­ter.  

Johnson’s Great Soci­ety pol­i­cy ini­tia­tives result­ed in leg­is­la­tion like the Civ­il Rights Act and the Vot­ing Rights Act. They required the nation­al gov­ern­ment to become more present in the states, from pro­vid­ing “fed­er­al reg­is­trars and mar­shals to enroll African Amer­i­can vot­ers” to imple­ment­ing fed­er­al gov­ern­ment-run com­mu­ni­ty action agen­cies in munic­i­pal­i­ties to help the poor, a Miller Cen­ter arti­cle said.  

Much of Johnson’s Great Soci­ety work came through exec­u­tive orders. As pres­i­dent, John­son passed 57 exec­u­tive orders, side-step­ping Con­gress through extra-leg­isla­tive pol­i­cy­mak­ing. A lot of his orders had to do with civ­il rights and affir­ma­tive action.  

In ear­ly August 1964, John­son announced that the North Viet­namese had attacked U.S. navy ships. Days lat­er, Con­gress passed a res­o­lu­tion giv­ing the pres­i­dent, in his pow­ers as com­man­der-in-chief, the pow­er “to take all nec­es­sary mea­sures to repel any armed attack against the forces of the Unit­ed States and to pre­vent fur­ther aggres­sion,” giv­ing the pres­i­dent great author­i­ty to deploy the armed forces. 

Pres­i­dent Lyn­don B. John­son. John­son used exec­u­tive orders to imple­ment his Great Soci­ety ini­tia­tives. Pho­to cour­tesy Loc’s Pub­lic Domain Archive

This led to the U.S. get­ting involved in the Viet­nam War with­out a for­mal dec­la­ra­tion of war from Con­gress. It allowed John­son to do what­ev­er he saw nec­es­sary to respond to attacks against the U.S. 

Though it is one of their con­sti­tu­tion­al pow­ers under Arti­cle One, Sec­tion Eight, Con­gress has not for­mal­ly declared war since World War II.

The res­o­lu­tion was repealed in 1971 as the war’s unpop­u­lar­i­ty grew, accord­ing to the Con­sti­tu­tion Cen­ter.

Ronald Rea­gan (1981–1989)  

Intro­duc­ing the uni­tary exec­u­tive the­o­ry

Ronald Reagan’s admin­is­tra­tion is often described as the first to use the uni­tary exec­u­tive the­o­ry to expand pow­er. Just one month after his first inau­gu­ra­tion, Rea­gan signed an exec­u­tive order allow­ing the pres­i­dent to have over­sight over reg­u­la­to­ry actions of fed­er­al agen­cies. Before imple­ment­ing any actions, the order said, agen­cies must sub­mit a “Reg­u­la­to­ry Impact Analy­sis” to the Direc­tor of the Office of Man­age­ment and Bud­get, who is appoint­ed by the pres­i­dent, to prove that the reg­u­la­tions would ben­e­fit soci­ety.  

David Schoen­brod, a trustee law pro­fes­sor emer­i­tus at New York Law School, said that Rea­gan was a selec­tive pro­po­nent of the sep­a­ra­tion of pow­ers, but only when it favored the exec­u­tive branch. 

Rea­gan fought against the leg­isla­tive veto, which allowed con­gres­sion­al res­o­lu­tions (which don’t have to be signed by the pres­i­dent) to over­turn exec­u­tive agency actions, though he did not fight against statutes that del­e­gat­ed leg­isla­tive pow­er to the exec­u­tive, such as the Sen­tenc­ing Reform Act of 1984 that gave a pres­i­den­tial­ly appoint­ed com­mis­sion pow­er to estab­lish crim­i­nal sen­tenc­ing rules.

Pres­i­dent Ronald Rea­gan. Rea­gan’s admin­is­tra­tion is often seen as the first to imple­ment the uni­tary exec­u­tive the­o­ry. Pho­to cour­tesy Loc’s Pub­lic Domain Archive

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